Story
Security Updates SQL Injection
Scope (what we tested)
Domains & services in scope: frontend and API endpoints for Netvorko and Amalipe (web/PWA and public API endpoints used by mobile clients).
Functional areas:
Authentication: /signup, /login, /password-reset, token refresh endpoints.
Profile management: create/update profile, avatar/photo upload, profile picture delivery endpoints.
Social features: posting comments, editing/deleting comments, feed endpoints, profile viewing.
Media endpoints: direct upload endpoints, CDN/edge URLs, thumbnail generation endpoints.
Database access layer: code paths that build and execute SQL queries for the above features.
Auth contexts exercised: unauthenticated, authenticated (normal user), authenticated (privileged roles where applicable), and session/token expiry conditions.
What isn’t included (or not publicly visible) ⚠️
Internal corporate networks, CI/CD servers, or non-production staging environments (unless explicitly provided).
Third-party vendor services (isolated vendor-managed storage buckets, external OAuth providers) beyond their integration surface (we only tested how our code calls them).
Physical security, social engineering, or employee phishing tests — these were out of scope.
Any exploit PoCs that could enable weaponization are omitted from public summaries; full technical details are restricted to the security team and remediation tickets.
Test methodology & tools used
A blended methodology combining automated tooling, manual verification, and source code review:
Automated scanners: OWASP ZAP and Burp Suite active scanning to identify obvious injection and auth weaknesses.
Targeted injection tools: SQLMap (controlled, limited), manual blind/time-based testing using Burp Intruder and custom scripts (rate-limited and monitored).
Manual exploratory testing and business-logic review: authenticated flows, session fixation checks, privilege escalation attempts, and chained attack scenarios.
Code review: manual review of server-side handlers and database access code (PHP, Python), looking for concatenated SQL, unparameterized queries, and improper input validation. Static checks augmented with linters and rules (PHPStan / Psalm or equivalent checks where available).
Post-testing verification: fixed items were retested manually and via automated scan re-runs.
Detailed findings (high level)
Severity distribution (summary):
No critical remote-code execution or unauthenticated account takeover remained after remediation.
No high severity data-exfiltration vectors were present at retest.
Medium / Low issues discovered and fixed; primarily information leakage, a small number of unparameterized SQL query cases in legacy code paths, and weak error handling that could reveal stack traces in some dev builds.
Representative findings (abstracted):
Information leakage (low): Some endpoints returned verbose error messages or stack traces in non-production builds — fixed by standardized error handling and masking in production.
Unparameterized queries (medium, limited scope): A few legacy API handlers constructed SQL fragments using string concatenation for optional filter clauses. These were exploitable only under specific, authenticated request shapes and were converted to prepared statements / parameterized ORM calls during remediation. No data exfiltration was observed in production logs beyond test attempts.
Auth logic hardening (low/medium): Rate limits and brute-force protection were improved on /login and password-reset flows (CAPTCHA/rate-limiting, token reuse prevention).
Media handling (low/medium): Early design allowed some metadata leakage in image URLs or thumbnails; fixes implemented were stricter filename handling, validation, and signed short-lived URLs for private content where appropriate.
Comments & profile inputs (low): Proper output encoding was enforced to prevent reflected/stored XSS in comment/profile rendering contexts.
Not tested / not found: No meaningful NoSQL/LDAP injection vectors were present in the tested code paths. Where non-SQL persistence exists, it was verified for input sanitization patterns during code review.
Post-exploitation & chained attacks
Assessors attempted realistic chained scenarios (e.g., SQLi → data leak → authorization bypass). The majority relied on multiple preconditions (e.g., an authenticated privileged user + legacy handler). After fixes, chained attacks were not reproducible.
Privilege escalation attempts (e.g., changing role flags via tampered payloads) were mitigated by server-side authorization checks and immutable fields for role assignment.
Database privileges & data access controls
Database user accounts were reviewed and adjusted to follow least privilege:
Web application DB users restricted to SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE on application schema tables only; no superuser usage from public app servers.
Administrative scripts run under separate, auditable credentials and are gated behind secure operator tooling.
Password storage: production passwords are stored using a secure adaptive hashing algorithm (bcrypt or Argon2) with per-user salts and recommended cost factors. Password reset tokens are single-use and time-limited.
Access logging: query-level logging for suspicious access patterns was enabled and monitored for the highest-sensitivity tables (user credentials, PII).
Remediation timeline & verification
Finding → Fix → Retest cycle:
Discovery & Triage — Findings were logged to the internal issue tracker and prioritized (days 0–3 after test completion).
Remediation — Engineering implemented fixes: parameterized queries, error masking, rate limiting, signed media URLs, and additional tests (days 3–14).
Verification / Retest — Security team reran manual tests and automated scans against the patched environment; retest confirmed fixes (days 14–18).
Number of issues: a small set of medium/low items (conservative public phrasing — specific counts and technical PoCs are stored in the internal technical report).
Evidence: Retest logs, Burp/ZAP scan exports, and updated unit/integration test cases were produced and archived. These artifacts are available to authorized security personnel.
Domains & services in scope: frontend and API endpoints for Netvorko and Amalipe (web/PWA and public API endpoints used by mobile clients).
Functional areas:
Authentication: /signup, /login, /password-reset, token refresh endpoints.
Profile management: create/update profile, avatar/photo upload, profile picture delivery endpoints.
Social features: posting comments, editing/deleting comments, feed endpoints, profile viewing.
Media endpoints: direct upload endpoints, CDN/edge URLs, thumbnail generation endpoints.
Database access layer: code paths that build and execute SQL queries for the above features.
Auth contexts exercised: unauthenticated, authenticated (normal user), authenticated (privileged roles where applicable), and session/token expiry conditions.
What isn’t included (or not publicly visible) ⚠️
Internal corporate networks, CI/CD servers, or non-production staging environments (unless explicitly provided).
Third-party vendor services (isolated vendor-managed storage buckets, external OAuth providers) beyond their integration surface (we only tested how our code calls them).
Physical security, social engineering, or employee phishing tests — these were out of scope.
Any exploit PoCs that could enable weaponization are omitted from public summaries; full technical details are restricted to the security team and remediation tickets.
Test methodology & tools used
A blended methodology combining automated tooling, manual verification, and source code review:
Automated scanners: OWASP ZAP and Burp Suite active scanning to identify obvious injection and auth weaknesses.
Targeted injection tools: SQLMap (controlled, limited), manual blind/time-based testing using Burp Intruder and custom scripts (rate-limited and monitored).
Manual exploratory testing and business-logic review: authenticated flows, session fixation checks, privilege escalation attempts, and chained attack scenarios.
Code review: manual review of server-side handlers and database access code (PHP, Python), looking for concatenated SQL, unparameterized queries, and improper input validation. Static checks augmented with linters and rules (PHPStan / Psalm or equivalent checks where available).
Post-testing verification: fixed items were retested manually and via automated scan re-runs.
Detailed findings (high level)
Severity distribution (summary):
No critical remote-code execution or unauthenticated account takeover remained after remediation.
No high severity data-exfiltration vectors were present at retest.
Medium / Low issues discovered and fixed; primarily information leakage, a small number of unparameterized SQL query cases in legacy code paths, and weak error handling that could reveal stack traces in some dev builds.
Representative findings (abstracted):
Information leakage (low): Some endpoints returned verbose error messages or stack traces in non-production builds — fixed by standardized error handling and masking in production.
Unparameterized queries (medium, limited scope): A few legacy API handlers constructed SQL fragments using string concatenation for optional filter clauses. These were exploitable only under specific, authenticated request shapes and were converted to prepared statements / parameterized ORM calls during remediation. No data exfiltration was observed in production logs beyond test attempts.
Auth logic hardening (low/medium): Rate limits and brute-force protection were improved on /login and password-reset flows (CAPTCHA/rate-limiting, token reuse prevention).
Media handling (low/medium): Early design allowed some metadata leakage in image URLs or thumbnails; fixes implemented were stricter filename handling, validation, and signed short-lived URLs for private content where appropriate.
Comments & profile inputs (low): Proper output encoding was enforced to prevent reflected/stored XSS in comment/profile rendering contexts.
Not tested / not found: No meaningful NoSQL/LDAP injection vectors were present in the tested code paths. Where non-SQL persistence exists, it was verified for input sanitization patterns during code review.
Post-exploitation & chained attacks
Assessors attempted realistic chained scenarios (e.g., SQLi → data leak → authorization bypass). The majority relied on multiple preconditions (e.g., an authenticated privileged user + legacy handler). After fixes, chained attacks were not reproducible.
Privilege escalation attempts (e.g., changing role flags via tampered payloads) were mitigated by server-side authorization checks and immutable fields for role assignment.
Database privileges & data access controls
Database user accounts were reviewed and adjusted to follow least privilege:
Web application DB users restricted to SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE on application schema tables only; no superuser usage from public app servers.
Administrative scripts run under separate, auditable credentials and are gated behind secure operator tooling.
Password storage: production passwords are stored using a secure adaptive hashing algorithm (bcrypt or Argon2) with per-user salts and recommended cost factors. Password reset tokens are single-use and time-limited.
Access logging: query-level logging for suspicious access patterns was enabled and monitored for the highest-sensitivity tables (user credentials, PII).
Remediation timeline & verification
Finding → Fix → Retest cycle:
Discovery & Triage — Findings were logged to the internal issue tracker and prioritized (days 0–3 after test completion).
Remediation — Engineering implemented fixes: parameterized queries, error masking, rate limiting, signed media URLs, and additional tests (days 3–14).
Verification / Retest — Security team reran manual tests and automated scans against the patched environment; retest confirmed fixes (days 14–18).
Number of issues: a small set of medium/low items (conservative public phrasing — specific counts and technical PoCs are stored in the internal technical report).
Evidence: Retest logs, Burp/ZAP scan exports, and updated unit/integration test cases were produced and archived. These artifacts are available to authorized security personnel.